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Abstract 
Purpose – The promotion of financial inclusion can disturb the composition of traditional bank 
concentration and change the relationship between bank concentration and the availability of 
SME financing. This paper concentrates on a less frequently explored area of research by 
examining the relationships between bank concentration, financial inclusion, and SME 
financing availability, respectively, and the interaction between bank concentration and 
financial inclusion after the implementation of a financial inclusion strategy in China. 
Design/methodology/approach – Using firm-level data from 1,509 listed SMEs in China from 
2007 to 2017 and applying rigorous analyses, we identify how bank concentration affects SME 
financing availability under the promotion of financial inclusion and also the mechanisms 
involved. 
Findings – We find that bank concentration and financial inclusion respectively have positive 
impacts on the credit available to listed SMEs, indicating that the promotion of financial 
inclusion in China has reached a new high watermark. The positive impact of bank 
concentration is reduced when the level of financial inclusion is high. Conversely, a higher 
level of financial inclusion favours SME credit availability at only a low degree of bank 
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concentration. Our findings suggest that financial inclusion has a substitution effect on bank 
concentration and has enabled us to add new interpretations to relevant theories, namely, the 
Market Power and Information Theories respectively.  
Originality/value – This study provides new insights into the relationship between bank 
concentration and SME finance availability under the promotion of financial inclusion. 
Keywords: bank concentration; financial inclusion; SME financing availability; FinTech; 
China. 
Paper type: Research paper  
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1. Introduction  
Financial inclusion (or inclusive finance) is the conceptual opposite of Financial Exclusion 
(Koku, 2015). Financial inclusion describes a social phenomenon whereby a group of 
vulnerable people, including individuals (e.g. farmers) and firms (e.g. small and medium-sized 
enterprises - SMEs), are at a disadvantage when seeking to access or utilise financial services 
and products provided by mainstream banks and financial institutions. In 2005, the United 
Nations (U.N.) proposed the establishment of a unified global system of financial inclusion to 
counter financial inequality. China responded quickly to the U.N. initiative and initiated 
banking sector reform, including reducing the banking market admittance threshold. 
As a result of financial inclusion promotion in China, many smaller and private financial 
institutions were able to gain access to the banking market, which had formerly been 
traditionally dominated by large state-owned banks, thus fundamentally changing the degree 
of bank concentration1. In the literature, there are two contradictory theories explaining the 
relationship between bank concentration and SME debt financing. On one hand, the Market 
Power Theory (Klein, 1971) asserts that the monopolistic power held by large banks in a 
concentrated bank market would reduce competition in the sector. Consequently, SMEs would 
be discriminated against when seeking access to bank loans because most of them are not 
publicly listed, lack collateral in the form of assets, and generally do not have credit ratings 
(Berger and Udell, 1998, 2002; Han et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018). On the other hand, Petersen 
and Rajan (1994, 1995) challenge the Market Power Theory by providing an alternative – the 
Information Theory. They argue that having market power enables banks to maintain stable 
relationships with clients without charging them higher loan interest rates because the long-
                                                            
1 Bank concentration is usually measured by the market share of the largest banks (e.g., top 3 or 5 banks) (Beck 
et al., 2005b).   
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term relationship helps reduce information asymmetry and operational costs. SMEs are 
therefore beneficial to bank concentration (Ryan et al., 2014).  
We argue that the preconditions for these two theories could be significantly changed when 
there are promotion and implementation of financial inclusion in the banking market.  
Therefore, the traditional views of Market Power and Information theories might invite novel 
or supplementary interpretations. For example, many newcomers to the lending market are 
diversified financial institutions and FinTech (financial technology) firms. They are smaller, 
less bureaucratic, flexible in providing new financial products and lending services, and 
particularly capable and robust in applying new lending technologies. Such features would 
make these lenders more likely to advance funds to SMEs. Thus, when they compete with large 
banks in the lending market, the structure of this market could be significantly altered by the 
innovative financial products and convenient lending services encouraged by the promotion of 
financial inclusion. Consequently, there is an urgent need for research evidence to facilitate 
scholarly debate and inspire theoretical contributions.  
   Since 15 years have passed since the promotion of financial inclusion in China, it is opportune 
and interesting to determine how new bank concentration and SME financing availability have 
been influenced by financial inclusion. A lack of evidence in the existing literature suggests 
that such research is timely and relevant. This paper therefore aims to illuminate this issue and 
find answers to three research questions: (1) whether, and to what extent, new bank 
concentration has improved the availability of SME financing since the promotion of financial 
inclusion; (2) how, and to what extent, financial inclusion has helped SMEs to access finance 
products and services; and (3) what is the relationship between bank concentration and 
financial inclusion?  
    This study collects data from 1,509 listed SMEs in 30 provinces of China from 2007 to 2017 
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and conducts rigorous analyses. Our findings confirm that, although there are imbalances in 
regions, new bank concentration in China has been dramatically improved in the sense of 
benefiting SME financing by means of financial inclusion promotion; that financial inclusion, 
measured by the availability, usability, and utility of financial services is also conducive to 
more than half of SMEs gaining access to banking services; and that financial inclusion 
becomes a vital substitute for bank concentration. We also find and report several other 
interesting findings, which have a number of meaningful policy implications for the Chinese 
government, as well as for similar transitional economies.     
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 states the theoretical arguments on 
bank concentration and SME financing, and financial inclusion and SME financing to establish 
testable research hypotheses. Section 3 introduces data, variables, and analytical models. 
Section 4 presents the firm level and regional level data analysis results. Section 5 concludes, 
highlights the contributions and policy implications, and discusses limitations. 
 
2. Theoretical argument and hypothesis development   
 
Two contradictory theories explain the relationship between bank market concentration and 
SME debt financing. Market Power Theory (Klein, 1971) suggests that when bank 
concentration occurs, bank market power increases and competition in the industry decreases 
because high concentration gives large banks monopolistic power in a region or country. Bank 
concentration reduces market efficiency, resulting in banks supplying fewer loans at higher 
interest rates to SMEs (Degryse and Ongena, 2005). Moreover, large banks are more likely to 
use income-gearing approaches when evaluating firms’ loan repayment ability; however, most 
SMEs are in an inferior position due to lack of collateral assets and credit ratings (Berger and 
Udell, 1998, 2002; Wu et al., 2008). Furthermore, bank concentration restricts SME financing 
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particularly severely in emerging countries, where the banking sector is dominated by large 
and state-owned banks that have bureaucratic structures and low operating efficiency (Beck et 
al., 2004, 2005a). In short, bank market concentration is not beneficial to SME financing.  
    Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995), however, propose a contrasting interpretation; namely, 
Information Theory. This argues that having market power secures banks a superposition, that 
there is no need for banks to charge premium loan interest rates but to motivate them in 
developing a long-run relationship with SMEs to overcome information opacity and reduce 
lending risks. In other words, private information acquisition is more easily internalised by 
lenders in a concentrated market. Thus, market power will benefit both banks and SMEs if they 
establish a stable relationship to lower information asymmetry and agency costs (Ryan et al., 
2014). To be specific, bank concentration can help minimise the problems of adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and hold-up caused by information asymmetry between lenders (banks) and 
borrowers (SMEs) (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006, 2008; Beck et al., 2004; Binks et al., 
2006). Therefore, bank market concentration is helpful for SME financing. 
    The debate above emphasises that the relationship between bank concentration and SME 
debt finance is a multi-faceted issue which should not be viewed in isolation. From the 
arguments adduced, we understand the key focuses for Market Power Theory relate to the 
percentage of large banks in the banking market, their monopolistic power, and diversity in the 
sector. Whereas, in respect of Information Theory, the critical issue is the reduction of 
operational costs through effective communication with clients to reduce information 
asymmetry. However, when other factors are considered, either Market Power or Information 
Theory might need to be changed. We argue that the promotion of financial inclusion in China 
is an important stimulant that is altering the structure and services in the banking sector, which 
can fundamentally influence the lending environment of SMEs. Therefore, the findings of 
Market Power Theory and Information Theory could be modified. We explain our argument 
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from two perspectives: changes in the banking market structure and banking services as a result 
of financial inclusion promotion in China, and how these changes have impacted on SMEs’ 
ability to access sources of finance.   
 
Changes in the banking market structure since promoting financial inclusion in China and 
their impact on the availability of SME financing 
China had a state-owned mono-banking system before initiating economic reform in 1978, 
comprising of a state-led, two-tiered banking system from 1979 to 1993 that was dominated by 
five large, state-owned commercial banks2. Between 1993 and 2005, despite market-orientated 
reform of the banking system being implemented, such changes had not significantly increased 
the availability of financing channels to private SMEs and resulted in the closure of a large 
number of small banks. Bank lending therefore continued to favour state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) and government-guaranteed infrastructure projects.  
    Since 2005, following the U.N.’s promotion of financial inclusion, a fundamental 
consolidation in the Chinese banking sector has been implemented by the financial authorities3 
to make the financial industry more inclusive. These reforms, consisting of a series of strategies, 
policies, and regulations, have led to fundamental changes in the banking market structure, 
financial infrastructure, and lending technology. Consequently, the proportion of the total 
assets of large commercial banks in the industry reduced from 56% in 2005 to 37% in 2016 
(CBRC, 2016), and a diversified banking structure has been rapidly established. Table 1 
provides details of financial service providers, their relationships with financial inclusion and 
                                                            
2 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank, and Bank 
of Communications 
3 People's Bank of China - PBOC, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission – CBIRC, formerly CBRC and 
CBIC , the China Securities Regulatory Commission - CSRC, and the Ministry of Finance -MOF 
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their proportionate share of the lending market by the end of 20174.  From Table 1, we can see 
that although the large five state-owned commercial banks still play an important role, their 
dominant position has been challenged by many other smaller financial service providers 
offering loan services to SMEs. The diversity of the banking market would certainly increase 
pressure on large banks to change their strategies to compete with their smaller competitors (Li 
et al., 2020). Large banks are more advanced in terms of financial and human resources, 
operational and management systems, and risk control compared to their smaller counterparts. 
Once large banks compete actively in the lending market, this new bank concentration is 
particularly helpful in helping to alleviate the difficulties SMEs face when seeking finance. 
Thus, the Market Power Theory can be restated when applying this new institutional context.    
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
    Based on this rationale, our first hypothesis can be presented as follows: 
    H1: Under the promotion of financial inclusion in China, bank concentration has positive 
effects on SME debt financing. 
 
Changes in banking services since the promotion of financial inclusion in China and their 
impacts on SME financing availability   
Accessibility, diversity, and appropriate products are essential elements for promoting the 
success of financial inclusion; however, the sustainability of such a system is challenging 
because of the substantial operational costs entailed. Reducing the asymmetry of information 
                                                            
4 It is worth noting that Table 1 excludes some new financial service providers such as nonbank digital payment providers, 
internet-based microlending, internet-based fund management, and internet equity-based crowdfunding because of data 
unavailable. 
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between banks and financial institutions and SMEs is, therefore, an effective way of reducing 
high operational costs, which is also a fundamental precept of Information Theory.  
China’s promotion of financial inclusion in the last 15 years has significantly changed the 
landscape of the banking industry. This achievement can be explained with reference to three 
factors: legislation, policy/regulation, and institutions. First, important legislative steps 
comprise of: (1) the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of China published the official financial inclusion document in 2013; (2) the State Council 
issued the ‘Plan for the Development of Financial Inclusion (2016-2020)’ in 2015; and (3) 
CBRC issued the ‘Implementation Plan for Establishing Financial Inclusion Division in Large 
and Medium-sized Commercial Banks’ in 2017.    
    Second, at the policy/regulation level, a series of fiscal, monetary, credit, and tax policies 
and regulations have been put in place to encourage the diversification of financial service 
providers and products. These policies include, for example, facilitating local governments’ 
risk compensation funds to SME lending; establishing government-owned guarantee 
companies for SMEs; exempting VAT and stamp tax on small loans; reducing the reserve ratio 
for banks (i.e., meeting the requirements for prudent operation and for holding a certain 
proportion of loans to SMEs);  subsidising the interest on loans to start-up and innovative firms;  
differentiating calculation and assessment of loan-to-deposit (LTD) ratios and non-
performance loan ratios for SME loans; and making exclusively financial bonds available for 
SMEs (World Bank, 2013, 2014). 
    Third, at the organisational level, the revolution of digital finance technology enables 
financial service providers to utilise and maintain cost-effective digital finance technology, 
which can significantly and effectively leverage operational processes and reduce associated 
costs. For instance, the use of digital borrowing platforms enables SMEs to gain swift access 
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to diverse, innovative, and suitable financial products at affordable and competitive prices, 
reducing reliance on physical bank branches. Digital lending and payments systems enable 
financial service providers to reach a broader range of borrowers’ groups; to design tailored 
financial products more easily; make transactions promptly; and obtain and store customer 
information more accurately and efficiently. The rise of competition from many new FinTech 
companies also forces traditional banks to adopt digital approaches themselves in order to 
compete, and to serve previously ignored borrowing groups such as SMEs (CGAP, 2015). 
    It follows from our discussion that the promotion of financial inclusion in China has 
significantly boosted SME debt availabilities because of the diversification of lending 
providers, suitable lending products, and the development of accessible lending services. Thus, 
we state our second testable hypothesis as follows:   
H2: Financial inclusion in China has had positive effects on SME debt financing. 
In the next section, we introduce our sample, variable measurements and analytical models.  
  
3. Data and model description 
Sample  
We target all listed companies in the new OTC market5 and the GEM6 in China from 2007 to 
2017, covering the period of financial inclusion promotion. The justification for starting from 
2007 is that, in 2006, the Ministry of Finance of China issued new accounting standards which 
introduced fair value in accounting information. As such, there is a significant difference in 
financial information disclosure for listed firms before and after 2006, especially in terms of 
                                                            
5 Established in 2006 and compared to China's the main and second board markets, the new third board market attracts more 
start-up firms that need financing but having lower listing requirements (Li et al., 2015).  
6 Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) is a board in the Stock Exchange of Shenzhen for growth enterprises that do not meet the 
requirements of profitability or track record in the main board of the exchange. 
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asset and liability measurements. Three criteria are applied in the process of finalising sample 
inclusion: first, we exclude all financial and utility firms to ensure financial information 
comparability in the sample; second, due to some abnormal and incomplete macroeconomic 
and financial institution information about the province of Tibet, the latter is excluded; and 
third, all firm-year observations with missing values are also excluded. Our final sample 
comprises 9978 firm-year observations from 1509 listed firms.  
The data used in the study is collected from three sources: (1) All province related data is 
obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook, issued by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China. Provincial data generally describe different characteristics of all provinces in China, 
including macroeconomic information and numbers of the legal person undertaking economic 
activity. (2) Asset information of financial institutions is collected from the Regional Financial 
Operation Reports published by PBOC covering the same period (2006-2016). (3) Information 
about firms’ access finance is collected from individual firms’ financial statements included in 
the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The database also 
discloses firms’ statutory information, such as primary and equity information, which can 
provide additional information for our sample selection.  
 
Dependent variables 
Two dependent variables are used to represent SME financing available in the study. First, 
FINANCE PROBABILITY is used as an indicator variable to examine the probability of a 
firm’s access to finance: it equals one when a firm has a loan and zero otherwise. Second, as a 
supplement to FINANCE PROBABILITY, a dependent measure of the bank credit financing 
scale, FINANCE SIZE is calculated by using bank loan/total assets.  
Measuring bank concentration 
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Following Love and Pería (2014), we construct two commonly used measures of bank 
concentration. First, CONCENTRATION-5 is the regional market power of the top five banks, 
which equals the share of bank assets held by the five largest banks in each province. Second, 
we use the Herfindahl index to measure bank concentration (CONCENTRATION-H), which 
is equal to the sum of the squared asset shares of each type of bank. In both cases, higher values 
indicate a higher concentration. We use 1-year lagged bank concentration to analyse the impact 
on SME finance.  
 
Measuring financial inclusion 
An index is used to measure Finance Inclusion, which is the measurement of the quality of 
financial services provided by regional financial institutions and the scope of their customers. 
The core value of the index represents the service coverage provided by financial institutions, 
i.e., the impact of financial services on social groups/enterprises. Considering that the purposes 
of the development of the financial inclusion system in China are to increase coverage, usability, 
and satisfaction of financial services, the calculation of the index following Zhou et al. (2018) 
includes three dimensions: availability, usability and utility of financial services. First, we 
consider two levels of information to capture the availability of financial services: customer 
group scope of services of financial institutions and customer group scope of services of 
financial personnel. Second, we add three variables into the usability of financial services: 
residents’ use of financial services, insurance density, and insurance penetration. Third, we 
consider two factors of the utility of financial services: utility embodied in deposit and other 
financial services, and utility incorporated in lending and other financial services. The specific 
indexes of financial inclusion are represented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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    Referring to the calculation method for the index of financial inclusion proposed by Sarma 
and Pais (2011), our index calculation steps can be explained as follows:  
(1) Standardised processing of various dimension indexes: to more intuitively display the 
differences among the dimension indexes at the regional level and avoid the impact of 
indexes in the order of magnitudes, standardised processing is conducted for every 
dimension index, which involves the processing of positive indexes and processing of 
negative indexes: 
 
𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡
′ =
𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡−𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥𝑘𝑡}
𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑥𝑘𝑡}−𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑥𝑘𝑡}
                                    (1) 
 
    xjkt represents the k index value of j province in year t,  𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡
′ refers to the value after xikt goes 
through standardised processing, max{xkt} is the maximum value of the k index in year t, and 
min{xkt} stands for the minimum value of the k index in year t. 
(2) Calculation of the weight of each dimension: to measure the importance of different 
dimensions in the inclusive finance indexes, the coefficient of variation method was used to 
calculate the weight of each dimension, and the calculation formula is as follows: 
 
𝑣𝑘𝑡 =
𝑆𝑘𝑡
𝐴𝑘𝑡
                                         (2) 
𝑤𝑘𝑡 =
𝑣𝑘𝑡
∑ 𝑣7𝑘=1 𝑘𝑡
                                      (3) 
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    where Vkt represents the coefficient of variation of the k index in year t, Skt represents the 
standard deviation of the k index in year t, Akt represents the mean value of the k index in year 
t, and Wkt stands for the weight of the k index in year t. 
(3) Calculation of the measuring values for all dimensions: to show the characteristics of 
the measuring values for all dimensions more intuitively, the index value that underwent 
standardised processing in each region is multiplied by the weight of each dimension, thereby 
obtaining the measuring value 𝐸𝑘𝑡  for each dimension: 
 
𝐸𝑘𝑡 = 𝑤𝑘𝑡 × 𝑥𝑗𝑘𝑡
′                                   (4) 
(4) Calculation of the index of inclusive finance: This study uses the calculation method 
for human development indexes to calculate the index of financial inclusion, correspondingly 
exhibiting service quality and customer group scope of financial institutions at the macro 
level.  
    The calculation formula is as follows: 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁 = 1 −
√∑ (𝑊𝑘𝑡−𝐸𝑘𝑡)2
7
𝑘=1
√∑ 𝑊𝑘𝑡
27
𝑘=1
                         （5） 
where INCLUSION represents the index of inclusive finance of j province in year t, 0≤ 
INCLUSION≤1, and we use 1-year lagged INCLUSION to analyse the loan effect on SME 
finance7. The higher the index of inclusive finance is, the better the environment for the 
development of financial inclusion in the region. 
                                                            
7Given that the bank lending decision are most likely based on firm financial information and macroeconomic situation from 
the previous year, our independent variables and control variables are all 1-year lagged. 
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Control variables 
There is strong evidence that firm characteristics and macroeconomic conditions can affect 
firms’ access to finance, and we thus control for these factors as 1-year lagged (see García-
Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2008; Rice and Strahan, 2010; Leon, 2015). Regarding firm 
characteristics, we include the size of the firm (Log SALES), which is the logarithm of lagged 
sales. Our specification also consists of the firm’s inventory status (INVENTORY), which 
equals the value of inventory to total assets. We also control for firm sale growth rate 
(GROWTH), firm return on assets (ROA), and firm age (log FIRM AGE). Last, we control for 
the type of ownership by including a dummy variable that is equal to one when part (or all) of 
the firm is owned by the State (STATE) to reflect a historical and cultural phenomenon in 
China: SMEs are often more difficult to obtain loans from state-owned banks.    
    Furthermore, the macroeconomic conditions are controlled by regional gross domestic 
product (log GDP) and the GDP growth rate (GDP GROWTH). Also, we control for the degree 
of government intervention using the proportion of the government’s financial expenditure on 
regional GDP (GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION) to capture another unique feature in China 
(Du et al., 2017).  
    A summary of basic statistics for the firm and province-level variables is reported in Table 
3. Table 3 shows that almost seven out of 10 (68.6%) firms in our sample obtain financing from 
banks, and the other 30% firms do not get bank loans. The average bank credit financing scale 
is 13% of total assets. In terms of financial inclusion, the average figure (0.618) is also 
encouraging. However, there is substantial variation among provinces as the reading is between 
0.17 and 0.998. The average share held by the top 5 banks in regions reaches near half (43.3%) 
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with the lowest 19.8%, whereas the highest is 62.1%. The Herfindahl index varies between 
0.106 and 0.707, with an average of 0.276.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Analytical model  
In this paper, we assume bank concentration has different effects on firms’ financing 
availability dependent on the degree of financial inclusion. We thus estimate using an 
econometric model in the following form: 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡−1 
+𝛽3𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡−1 × 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑈𝑆𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑗𝑡−1 
+𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀                                    (6) 
    where firms’ access to finance is measured as FINANCE PROBABILITY and FINANCE 
SIZE, in the baseline analysis, for the Probit and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) models, 
respectively. Control variables are a set of time-varying firm-level characteristics and 
provincial macroeconomic conditions, as well as industry and year dummies. 
    Equation (6) tests the effect of bank concentration on a firm’s access to finance. In addition, 
our model also includes the interaction term of bank concentration with financial inclusion 
(CONCENTRATION×INCLUSION). This interaction variable is intended to capture how and 
to what extent financial inclusion affects the impact of banking market structure on a firm’s 
access to finance. 
    Additionally, some SMEs which do not have bank loans might lack them because of other 
reasons (e.g. they do not need bank loans); in this case, Probit or OLS models used to analyse 
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FINANCE PROBABILITY and FINANCE SIZE may cause estimation bias due to the problem 
of sample selection (Heckman, 1979). To eliminate the influence of the sample selection, we 
employ Heckman’s selection models and analyse FINANCE PROBABILITY and FINANCE 
SIZE in a unified model in robustness checks. In line with the principle of Heckman’s selection 
models, we first use the Probit model to estimate the Equation of FINANCE PROBABILITY 
and obtain the estimated value of the probability λ for each SME, and then add λ as a control 
variable in the Equation of FINANCE SIZE to eliminate the influence of sample selection.  
The analytical results are presented in the next section. It includes two subsections. In the 
first subsection (4.1), we test the two hypotheses and the issues surrounded based on the firm-
level data; in the second subsection (4.2), we look at how regional credit environment plays a 
part in the relationship between bank concentration/financial inclusion and SME finance 
availabilities. 
    
4. Results 
4.1.The impacts of bank concertation and financial inclusion on SME’s debt financing  
Baseline regression 
The estimation of Equation (6) is reported in Table 4. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 4 are 
estimated using Probit and OLS estimators with the sector and year dummies, respectively. In 
Table 4, we also consider the potential endogeneity of firm-level variables that may stem from 
time-invariant confounding factors. To address this, we account for a firm fixed effect and the 
results reported in columns (2) and (4).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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    First, to achieve our first research objective, we are primarily interested in assessing how 
and to what extent the new bank concentration under the promotion of financial inclusion 
impacts the listed SME financing availability. From columns (1) and (3) of Table 4, we observe 
that the coefficients of CONCENTRATION are positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level, suggesting that Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. The finding supports that under the promotion 
of financial inclusion in China, bank concentration has positively affected the sample SME 
finance probability and finance size. When we further consider the influence of financial 
inclusion by using an interaction variable (CONCENTRATION x INCLUSION), the result is 
significantly negative, indicating that the promotion of financial inclusion has significantly 
decreased the effect of bank concentration on SME financing. Additionally, a threshold 
measure is added for a more accurate estimation on the impact. As indicated in the second row 
from the bottom of Table 4, when financial inclusion is higher than 0.90 (or 0.46), bank 
concentration would have a negative effect on firm finance probability (or finance size). The 
finding demonstrates that SME credit availability from bank concentration (new structure of 
banking market) in China has been dynamically improved in the environment of financial 
inclusion. 
    Second, in relation to the second objective, we are equally interested in evaluating the effect 
of financial inclusion on the listed SME financing availability. We observe that the coefficients 
of INCLUSION are positively and statistically significant, which confirms our Hypothesis 2 
and indicates that financial inclusion in China plays a vital role in helping SME financing. 
Besides, the interaction variable (CONCENTRATION x INCLUSION) with significantly 
negative value suggests that the impact of financial inclusion on listed SME finance availability 
is dampened by bank concentration, meaning the role of financial inclusion would be reduced 
in a highly concentrated bank market; in other words, financial inclusion has partially 
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substituted for bank concentration. Similarly, after adding a threshold measure, the last row of 
Table 4 shows that financial inclusion has a positive effect on firm finance probability (or 
finance size) for the levels of bank concentration lower than 37% (or 31%).  
    Third, we want to know if any kind of SMEs benefits more than others in obtaining debt 
finance. The firm-level control variables suggest that state-owned firms (STATE) and larger 
companies (Log SALES) have a better position to access bank finance than other types of firms 
which have better financial performance (ROA). The result indicates that smaller and private 
firms are still in a disadvantaged position in obtaining financial resources compared to their 
state-owned and large counterparts, even though financial inclusion has made substantial 
progress.   
    Fourth, we also want to see if regional economic development and government intervention 
contribute to SME finance availability. Turning to the provincial control variables, column (1) 
suggests that a regional level of development (GDP GROWTH) is not a key factor for firm 
finance probability. This result perhaps can be explained by the fact that most policies and 
regulations relating to banking finance are mainly set up at the national rather than local level, 
and therefore local economic development is irrelevant. Another finding is that government 
intervention (GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION) is negatively correlated with firm finance 
probability and finance size at a 1% statistically significant level. This result, perhaps, should 
be understood as a reflection of the extent to which the government still controls state-owned 
and large banks.  
Finally, the results in columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 from the firmly fixed-effect model 
suggest that accounting for firm-level time-unvarying unobservable heterogeneity does not 
alter the conclusions of our baseline estimation. 
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Robustness checks 
We consider robustness checks for baseline analysis from three perspectives: (1) the 
replacement of measures of financial inclusion, bank concentration and control variables; (2) 
the estimated model; and (3) sample dependence. The results are presented in Table 5. 
 
(1) Alternative measures of bank concentration, financial inclusion, and control variables. 
Table 5 re-estimates the baseline estimation using alternative measures of bank concentration, 
financial inclusion and control variables. First, we replace measuring bank concentration by 
the Herfindahl index of assets in all types of banks (CONCENTRATION-H). Also, according 
to Goldsmith (1969), the financial interrelations ratio can be used to measure a region’s 
financial development level and we, therefore, presume that the level of financial development 
should be related to the level of financial inclusion. Referring to the relevant studies conducted 
by Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Acharya and Xu (2017) in financial development, we 
replace the measure of financial inclusion by total regional financing in the GDP ratio 
(INCLUSION-DL), which is calculated as (Stock Market Capitalisation + Bond Market 
Capitalisation + Bank Credit)/ (GDP). The results in Table 5 (see columns (1) and (2)) convert 
unchanged meanings with that in the baseline analysis. Furthermore, we aggregate the firm-
level controls at the province-year level, referring to Harrison et al. (2014). We replace the 
firm-level variables with the average values for the size, growth, performance, inventory, and 
age of firms in the same province and with the share of firms in the province that are state-
owned. Again, the regression results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 show the same 
conclusion with that of Table 4. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
(2) Heckman’s selection model 
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    To address the potential bias from the problem of sample selection, we employ Heckman’s 
selection model. We include two exclusion variables that probably affect finance probability 
in the selection equation, and the ratio of liability to the asset in the last year, LEVit-1, which 
represents the real financial leverage of the firm. We also include the ratio of cash to assets in 
the previous year, CASH it-1 to reflect the internal capital available for investment in the firm. 
    We re-estimate our baseline estimation using Heckman’s selection model and present the 
results in Table 6. The findings suggest that the L.R. tests are statistically significant at a 1% 
level, indicating we should apply the Heckman’s selection model to test the relationship 
between bank concentration and SME financing availability. The exclusion variable “CASH” 
is negative and statistically significant at a 1% level, but “LEV” is not statistically significant.  
    Regarding the variables that we are interested in, the coefficients of CONCENTRATION-5 
are positive and statistically significant at a 1% level in columns (1) and (2). Meanwhile, the 
interaction variable CONCENTRATION-5× INCLUSION, in columns (1) and (2), is 
significantly negative. The findings are consistent with the baseline estimation and confirm its 
robustness. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
(3) Sample dependence  
To test the sample’s dependence, we examine whether the impact of bank concentration and 
financial inclusion depends on some specific firm characteristics (i.e., firm size, age, and state 
status), and the results are presented in Table 7. Generally, bank concentration has a positive 
effect on firm finance probability and finance size; however, it is diminished by the degree of 
financial inclusion. The results are consistent with those of the main analysis. We also find that 
bank concentration affects firm finance probability and finance size positively, notably when 
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financial inclusion is low. The findings further demonstrate the conclusion made in the primary 
analysis. The analysis is explained below.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
    First, we include a dummy variable for firm size (SIZE): zero if the firm’s assets are smaller 
than the median, and one if the firm’s assets are larger than the median. Second, a dummy 
variable is included as one if the firm is older than the median firm age in our samples (AGE), 
and zero otherwise. Third, we explore the effect of the nature of firm ownership (STATE): one 
if part (or all) of the firm is owned by the State, and zero otherwise. In column (2) of Table 7, 
we find that the impact of bank concentration on firm finance size depends on the size of the 
firm, and the interaction term of SIZE with concentration is positive and statistically significant 
at a 1% level. This result suggests that large firms can get more credit in a high bank 
concentration market compared to small firms. For an accurate estimation, we find that when 
SIZE equals one, CONCENTRATION has a positive effect on firm finance probability for 
levels of INCLUSION below 0.642 ((0.143+0.133)/0.430. In contrast, when SIZE equals zero, 
this threshold is lower, at 0.332 (0.143/0.430). This result suggests that large firms would 
benefit from bank concentration when the level of financial inclusion is lower. 
    In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, the impact of bank concentration on firm finance 
probability and size depends on the age of the firm, and the interaction terms of AGE with 
concentration are positive and statistically significant at 5% and 1%, respectively, which means 
long-established companies also have benefited from bank concentration more than young 
firms. When AGE equals one, CONCENTRATION has a positive impact on firm finance 
probability and firm finance size for levels of INCLUSION below 0.978 ((4.625+1.523)/6.287) 
and 0.642 ((0.151+0.147)/0.464); whereas when AGE equals zero, INCLUSION has a positive 
influence on firm finance probability and firm finance size before bank concentration reaches 
 23 
0.735 (4.625/6.278) and 0.325 (0.151/0.464). The result indicates that long-established 
companies can obtain credit more easily when the degree of bank concentration increases. 
    Meanwhile, the interaction term of AGE with INCLUSION positively affect firm finance 
size and is statistically significant at a 1% level, which means long-established companies seem 
to have benefited from financial inclusion more than young firms. When AGE equals one, 
INCLUSION has a positive impact on firm finance probability and firm finance size for levels 
of CONCENTRATION below 34.9% ((0.133+0.029)/0.464), while when AGE equals zero, 
INCLUSION has a positive effect on finance size before bank concentration reaches 28.7% 
(0.133/0.464). The result reveals that long-established companies can more easily obtain credit 
when the degree of financial inclusion increases. 
Finally, we find that the STATE variable is positive in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7, but it 
negatively affects bank concentration to boost finance probability and finance size. When 
STATE equals one, CONCENTRATION has a positive impact on firm finance probability and 
firm finance size for levels of INCLUSION below 0.606 ((7.505-3.971)/5.829) and 0.334 
((0.237-0.102)/0.403), while when STATE equals zero, INCLUSION has a positive influence 
on firm finance probability and firm finance size before bank concentration reaches 1.2878 
(7.505/5.829) and 0.588 (0.237/0.403). The finding suggests that state-owned enterprises can 
easily obtain credit. Nevertheless, the benefit decreases with increases in bank concentration. 
 
4.2.The impacts of bank concentration and financial inclusion linking to regional credit 
level 
                                                            
8 That means bank concentration always has a positive impact on firm finance probability because the turning point is above 
1. 
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The baseline results in the last subsection show that bank concentration and financial inclusion 
affect the listed SMEs finance probability and finance size.  However, SMEs access to finance 
can also be influenced by other factors. Recent studies show that in emerging countries, the 
regional credit environment can affect SMEs access to credit and performance (e.g. Chauvet 
and Jacolin, 2017). In this subsection, we extend our analysis by investigating how bank 
concentration and financial inclusion affect SMEs’ access to finance relating to the region’s 
credit level.  
    Unlike an individual SME’s financing availability, which might be largely dependent on the 
firm’s characteristics and risk level, the regional/provincial credit environment acts a function 
that represents the region/province’s financial development. We measure the regional credit 
environment at the provincial level. Using standard measures, we construct a regional credit 
environment, AVERAGE FINANCE PROBABILITY as the share of firms in province j that 
have a bank loan, and AVERAGE FINANCE SIZE as the average loan ratio of firms in 
province j. We intend to capture the distribution of credit at the provincial level among the 
firms in the province.  
    The results reported in Table 8 show the likelihood of accessing a loan, and the size of the 
average loan increases with the level of bank concentration. The estimation results suggest that 
the degree of bank concentration in a given province affects finance probability and finance 
size of the firms in the region. Moreover, the impact of bank concentration on regional finance 
probability and finance size are also diminished by financial inclusion, which suggests that 
bank concentration is conducive to a better regional credit environment only in the markets 
with low financial inclusion. From Table 8, we can see that when financial inclusion is lower 
than 0.78 (or 0.55), bank concentration has a positive effect on regional access to a loan (or 
regional loan size). 
 25 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
On the other hand, financial inclusion also has positive effects on finance probability and 
finance size for firms in a given province. As with the negative coefficient of the interaction 
term between financial inclusion and bank concentration, financial inclusion has positive 
effects on regional access to a loan (or regional loan size) for levels of bank concentration lower 
than 36% (or 31%). The findings suggest that bank concentration and financial inclusion also 
play substitution effects for improving regional credit environment. The results are consistent 
with those observed in the previous subsection, which indicates that bank concentration and 
financial inclusion affect SME financing availability through improving the regional credit 
environment. 
5. Conclusion 
The promotion of financial inclusion in China in the last 15 years involves many smaller and 
non-state-owned financial institutions entering the lending market and competing with large 
and state-owned banks. Thus, the traditional bank concentration, which is unfavourable for 
SMEs to secure access to bank loans, is expected to respond accordingly. To answer the three 
research questions: (1) whether and to what extent the new bank concentration has improved 
the difficulty of SME financing since promoting financial inclusion; (2) how and to what extent 
financial inclusion policy and approaches have helped SMEs in accessing finance products and 
services; and (3) what is the relationship between bank concentration and financial inclusion, 
this study collects data from 1,509 listed SMEs in 30 provinces of China spanning 2007 and 
2017, conducts rigorous analyses, and finds convincing answers.   
    In respect of the first question, we find that new bank concentration has positively and 
significantly affected the sample SME debt finance in the environment of financial inclusion. 
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There are around 70% of sample firms obtaining bank loans, indicating that the promotion of 
financial inclusion has dramatically improved SME credit availability from bank concentration 
in China; however, variations in different regions exist. With respect to the second question, 
the results suggest that financial inclusion has played positive and significant roles in enhancing 
SME debt financing (about 62% of sample firms benefit from financial inclusion despite 
discrepancies across regions). As regards the third question, the results from the interaction 
variable (CONCENTRATION x INCLUSION) reveal several interesting findings. For 
example, bank concentration is suitable for SME financing particularly in regions with a lower 
degree of financial inclusion; the positive effects of financial inclusion on SME credit 
availabilities are strengthened in the regions with lower bank concentration. The results suggest 
that new bank concentration and financial inclusion in China are substitutes for each other to 
some extent. This finding is a strong indication of the remarkable progress that has been made 
in widening financial inclusion in China.       
Furthermore, this paper also explores other related issues and reports significant findings. 
We find state-owned, larger, and long-established firms still benefit more from new bank 
concentration and financial inclusion compared to their private, smaller, and more recently 
established counterparts. This finding perhaps indicates that, despite outstanding progress, 
financial inclusion is still a long way from satisfying the needs of vulnerable groups such as 
SMEs. We also find that the regional development level does not have a strong connection to 
SME financing, but that a regional credit level does. Specifically, bank concentration and 
financial inclusion influence SME financing by means of an improved regional credit 
environment.  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of financial 
inclusion on the relationship between bank concentration and SME financing. Therefore, we 
are unable to compare our results with others. However, we can discuss our findings relating 
 27 
to the effect of bank concentration on firms’ financing with that in relevant studies. For example, 
large scale research conducted by Beck et al. (2004) in 74 countries reveals that bank 
concentration obstructs firms with different sizes in obtaining finance only in countries having 
low levels of economic and institutional development. The findings of Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt (2006) from reviewing substantial empirical articles also confirm that the level of 
financial and institutional development is vital for SMEs’ growth and access to external finance. 
The promotion of financial inclusion is an important component of financial and institutional 
setting, and therefore our results echo the findings of Beck et al. (2004) and Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2006). We further provide robust evidence that a supportive institutional 
environment of financial inclusion for SME financing is through the increase of banking market 
competition, diversity of financial product providers, and diversification of innovative and 
technological banking services. Another two profound studies are Love and Pería (2014) and 
Ryan et al. (2014), and both are large size of international surveys with multi-year data. Their 
findings support Market Power theory with the confirmation that a low competitive banking 
market constrains the accessibility of SME debt financing and requires a more diversified 
banking structure to reduce the dependency of large banks. Our results are consistent with theirs 
in principle, but furthermore indicates that financial inclusion is one of the available and 
effective strategies to increase bank competitions and decrease SMEs’ dependency on large 
banks. However, our research evidence limits in one country (China).  A U.S. data analysis 
(Han et al., 2017) suggests that both Market Power and Information theories are relevant in the 
explanation of the relationship between bank concentration and SME financing. In a 
concentrated banking market, SMEs are restricted in obtaining bank loans; however, they can 
still gain from a long-run relationship with banks. Compared to Han et al. (2017), our study 
takes a novel perspective (financial inclusion) and adds new explanations to the two theories. 
We will explain this point as our theoretical contributions below.      
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    This paper makes theoretical and empirical contributions to this under-researched area. We 
have added new explanations to the Market Power and Information Theories. We argue that 
when the banking market structure changed, with many more financial institutions engaging in 
competition because of the promotion of financial inclusion, large banks were compelled to 
enter the race. Their advantages in finance and human resources, operational and management 
systems, and risk control can make positive and significant contributions to SME financing. In 
short, a dynamic and diversified bank concentration with the healthy competition will benefit 
SME debt financing. Concerning the Information Theory, we argue that rapid development of 
new technologies and their applications in the banking sector, e.g. online banking, mobile 
payment (Oni et al., 2016; Bradley and Loane, 2017), have significantly increased the 
availability of different types of financial products and decreased the running costs of the 
industry. The participation of banks, other financial institutions and FinTech firms improves 
the provision of finance to financially vulnerable firms such as SMEs. We argue that the 
promotion of financial inclusion is a powerful external stimulant for revolutionising banking 
structure and services and supporting SME financing. Empirically, our study has provided 
convincing evidence endorsing our arguments. The results also reveal other meaningful 
findings, as discussed earlier.    
    Our research findings have three policy implications. First, the remarkable achievement from 
the financial inclusion promotion has been confirmed. The Chinese government should thus 
continue its strategies and approaches for the encouragement of diversity and competition in 
banking market and lending services. Second, as we observed, since small and private firms 
still face difficulties in gaining access to loans in comparison to large firms, arguably the 
government should consider strengthening their policies to support these vulnerable firms and 
narrow the gap. Third, from the evidence of regional imbalance in the development of financial 
inclusion, the government needs to conduct more policy research to inform the development of 
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differential regional policies and approaches. Additionally, the findings of our study have 
relevance to other transitional economies whose banking markets were dominated by state-
owned banks in the past, and are currently in the implementation phase of financial inclusion; 
for example, some former communist countries in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, etc.) and 
Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, etc.).     
    We also acknowledge some limitations associated with the study. The primary consideration 
relates to how closely our sample is representative of the underlying population. Our focus is 
SMEs’ access to finance. Thus, ideally, the sample should represent the general population of 
SMEs rather than listed firms, which are at the upper end of the population. However, data 
accessibility and availability limit our choice. Therefore, caution should be exercised when 
applying the results to the entire population of SMEs. Moreover, the future research trajectory 
should take into account the development of FinTech companies and digital finance 
technologies and their influence financial inclusion, because they are developing rapidly and 
are likely to have a significant impact on banking market structure and lending technologies in 
the future.  
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Tables  
                                              Table 1 New Banking Market Structure (by the end of 2017) 
Category of financial 
service providers 
 
Relationship with 
financial inclusion  
Type of financial 
service providers 
No. of 
providers  
Total assets  
(billion RMB)  
No. of 
branches  
Loan balance 
(billion RMB) 
Traditional financial 
service providers 
Large banks in which 
financial inclusion is NOT 
a focus 
State-owned commercial 
banks 
 
5 756,824 68,709 504,901 
Joint-stock commercial 
banks 
 
12 379,746.6 15,928 225,204 
Postal Savings Bank of 
China [PSBC] 
 
1 83,389.4 38,351 35,415 
Total 
 
18 
 
1,219,960 122,988 765,520 
Small banks/credit 
cooperatives in which 
financial inclusion IS a 
focus 
City commercial banks 
 
124 344,347 16,939 119,934 
Rural Commercial 
Banks (RCOMBs), 
Rural Cooperative 
Banks (RCOPBs), 
Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs) 
 
2,245 315,121.6 77,844 112,848 
New-type financial 
service providers 
Village and Townships 
Banks (VTBs), 
Microcredit companies 
(MCCs), 
Rural Mutual Credit 
Cooperatives 
1,617 14,855 5,684 8,913 
Total  3,986 674,323.6 100,467   241,695 
Fintech companies 
involving financial 
inclusion with data 
available  
Peer-to-peer (P2P) 
lending platforms 
 
1,500   38,952 
Internet banks 
 
9   1,148 
Total  
 
1,509 N/A N/A 40,100 
                                             Source from: Official websites including PBOC, CBRC, CBIC and other formal reports.
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 Table 2 The index of finance inclusion 
Dimension Specific Index Descriptive Index 
Availability of financial services 
Number of branches of financial 
institutions/100,000 persons 
Customer group scope of services of 
financial institutions 
Number of employees of financial 
institutions/100,000 persons 
Customer group scope of services of 
financial personnel 
Usability of financial services 
Savings of urban and rural 
residents/person 
Residents’ use of financial services 
Insurance income/population size Insurance density 
Insurance income/GDP Insurance penetration 
Utility of financial services 
Deposit balance/GDP 
Utility embodied in deposit and other 
financial services 
Loan balance/GDP 
Utility embodied in lending and 
other financial services 
 
                                                                                 Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Firm-level variables       
FINANCE PROBABILITY 9978 0.686 1.000 0.464 0.000 1.000 
FINANCE SIZE 9978 0.130 0.074 0.162 0.000 1.442 
CONCENTRATION-5 9978 0.433 0.443 0.061 0.198 0.621 
CONCENTRATION-H 9978 0.276 0.277 0.044 0.106 0.707 
INCLUSION 9978 0.618 0.558 0.325 0.017 0.998 
Log SALES 9978 18.985 19.214 1.561 8.491 25.023 
GROWTH 9978 0.268 0.157 0.579 -0.999 10.889 
ROA 9978 0.101 0.086 0.113 -1.097 1.533 
INVENTORY 9978 0.142 0.115 0.119 0.000 0.846 
Log FIRM AGE 9978 2.258 2.303 0.538 0.000 3.526 
STATE 9978 0.487 0.000 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Province-level variables       
Log GDP 9978 10.124 10.043 0.666 6.952 11.300 
GDP GROWTH 9978 0.100 0.096 0.025 -0.025 0.192 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 9978 0.171 0.169 0.049 0.084 0.437 
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Table 4 Baseline estimates - the impact of financial inclusion and bank concentration on SME financing 
Variables 
FINANCE PROBABILITY FINANCE SIZE 
Baseline 
(1) 
Firm fixed effect 
(2) 
Baseline 
(3) 
Firm fixed effect 
(4) 
CONCENTRATION-5 5.446*** 
(5.43) 
14.37*** 
(5.10) 
0.201*** 
(3.27) 
0.440 
(4.52)*** 
CONCENTRATION-5×INCLUSION -6.023*** 
(-4.30) 
-18.00*** 
(-8.11) 
-0.441 
(-4.99)*** 
-0.551*** 
(-7.44) 
INCLUSION 2.224*** 
(3.54) 
6.178*** 
(4.59) 
0.135*** 
(3.39) 
0.167*** 
(3.58) 
Log SALES 0.604*** 
(25.23) 
1.060*** 
(12.18) 
0.030*** 
(22.27) 
0.035*** 
(13.43) 
GROWTH 0.322*** 
(6.51) 
0.157** 
(2.50) 
0.009*** 
(3.33) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
ROA -3.654*** 
(-15.19) 
-1.260*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.273*** 
(-18.78) 
-0.093*** 
(-6.34) 
INVENTORY 2.683*** 
(11.70) 
2.657*** 
(5.08) 
0.104*** 
(7.51) 
0.102*** 
(5.46) 
Log FIRM AGE 0.0112 
(0.21) 
0.634*** 
(3.07) 
-0.009*** 
(-2.67) 
0.006 
(0.83) 
STATE 0.566*** 
(8.84) 
0.302** 
(2.39) 
0.048*** 
(12.39) 
0.022*** 
(4.88) 
Log GDP -0.244*** 
(-2.76) 
2.276** 
(2.33) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.107*** 
(3.20) 
GDP GROWTH 1.821 
(0.94) 
-2.949 
(-0.74) 
-0.275** 
(-2.27) 
-0.401*** 
(-2.92) 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION -3.831*** 
(-3.68) 
7.448* 
(1.74) 
-0.269*** 
(-4.10) 
0.639*** 
(4.51) 
Observations 9978 9978 9978 9978 
Sector dummies yes no yes no 
Firm fixed effect no yes no yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
Threshold in INCLUSION(a) 0.90 0.80 0.46 0.80 
Threshold in CONCENTRATION(b) 37% 34% 31% 30% 
z statistics or t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
(a) Level of INCLUSION above which CONCENTRATION has a negative impact. 
(b) Level of CONCENTRATION above which INCLUSION has a negative impact. 
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Table 5 Alternative measure of variables - the impact of financial inclusion and bank concentration on 
SME financing 
Variables 
Alternative dependence variables Aggregation of firm-level controls 
FINANCE 
PROBABILITY 
(1) 
FINANCE  
SIZE 
(2) 
FINANCE 
PROBABILITY 
(3) 
FINANCE  
SIZE 
(4) 
CONCENTRATION-H 9.192*** 
(5.36) 
0.409*** 
(3.73) 
8.354*** 
(4.93) 
0.379*** 
(3.24) 
CONCENTRATION-H× 
INCLUSION-DL 
-5.717*** 
(-5.18) 
-0.386*** 
(-5.43) 
-5.100*** 
(-4.66) 
-0.362*** 
(-4.73) 
INCLUSION-DL 1.642*** 
(4.95) 
0.105*** 
(4.94) 
1.474*** 
(4.53) 
0.100*** 
(4.42) 
Log SALES 0.574*** 
(23.60) 
0.029*** 
(20.71) 
0.413*** 
(7.83) 
0.024*** 
(6.88) 
GROWTH 0.292*** 
(5.91) 
0.007*** 
(2.81) 
0.245** 
(2.21) 
0.003 
(0.48) 
ROA -3.498*** 
(-14.46) 
-0.267*** 
(-17.86) 
-3.157*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.264*** 
(-6.45) 
INVENTORY 2.551*** 
(10.98) 
0.096*** 
(6.73) 
2.067*** 
(3.18) 
-0.059 
(-1.39) 
Log FIRM AGE 0.0203 
(0.38) 
-0.008** 
(-2.54) 
0.108 
(0.73) 
-0.025** 
(-2.55) 
STATE 0.571*** 
(8.76) 
0.051*** 
(12.66) 
0.115 
(0.70) 
0.023** 
(2.04) 
GDP -0.231** 
(-2.51) 
-0.010* 
(-1.67) 
-0.201** 
(-2.21) 
-0.008 
(-1.36) 
GDP GROWTH 6.758*** 
(3.19) 
0.205 
(1.54) 
6.927*** 
(3.40) 
0.257* 
(1.85) 
GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION 
-3.741*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.366*** 
(-5.49) 
-3.127*** 
(-3.06) 
-0.332*** 
(-4.76) 
Observations 9978 9978 9978 9978 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
z statistics or t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Table 6 Heckman’s selection model estimates 
 FINANCE  
PROBABILITY 
(1) 
FINANCE  
SIZE 
(2) 
CONCENTRATION-5 2.359 
(3.70)*** 
0.215 
(2.64)*** 
CONCENTRATION-5×INCLUSION -2.758 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.280 
(-2.13)** 
INCLUSION  1.093 
(2.54)** 
0.0691 
(1.18) 
LEV 0.004 
(0.96) 
 
CASH -0.015 
(-16.41)*** 
 
Observations 9978 9978 
Control variables yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes 
LR test 28.79*** 28.79*** 
z statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 7 The impact of bank concentration and financial inclusion on SME financing linking to firm 
characteristics 
Variables 
SIZE AGE STATE 
FINANCE 
PROBABILIT
Y 
(1) 
FINANC
E  
SIZE 
(2) 
FINANCE 
PROBABILIT
Y 
(3) 
FINANC
E  
SIZE 
(4) 
FINANCE 
PROBABILIT
Y 
(5) 
FINANC
E  
SIZE 
(6) 
CONCENTRATION
-5 
5.041*** 
(4.89) 
0.143** 
(2.24) 
4.625*** 
(4.45) 
0.151** 
(2.38) 
7.505*** 
(6.67) 
0.237*** 
(3.45) 
CONCENTRATION
-5 x INCLUSION 
 
-6.245*** 
(-4.43) 
-0.430*** 
(-4.83) 
-6.287*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.464*** 
(-5.24) 
-5.829*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.403*** 
(-4.42) 
INCLUSION 2.273*** 
(3.58) 
0.134*** 
(3.32) 
2.297*** 
(3.62) 
0.133*** 
(3.32) 
2.038*** 
(3.21) 
0.124*** 
(3.08) 
CONCENTRATION 
x  
VARIABLE 
1.290 
(1.58) 
0.133*** 
(2.68) 
1.523** 
(2.05) 
0.147*** 
(2.83) 
-3.971*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.102* 
(-1.78) 
INCLUSION x 
VARIABLE 
0.120 
(0.76) 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
0.128 
(0.81) 
0.029*** 
(2.94) 
0.243 
(1.51) 
-0.0108 
(-1.07) 
VARIABLE -0.651* 
(-1.91) 
-0.075*** 
(-3.55) 
-1.307*** 
(-3.83) 
-0.080*** 
(-3.67) 
2.164*** 
(5.37) 
0.099*** 
(3.98) 
Observations 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 9978 
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
z statistics or t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
 
Table 8 Estimates of the impact of bank concentration and financial inclusion on regional average finance 
 
Variables 
AVERAGE FINANCE 
PROBABILITY 
(1) 
AVERAGE  
FINANCE SIZE 
(2) 
CONCENTRATION-5 1.256*** 
(34.88) 
0.296*** 
(18.86) 
CONCENTRATION-5x INCLUSION -1.607 
(-30.97)*** 
-0.537 
(-23.73)*** 
INCLUSION 0.580*** 
(24.83) 
0.164*** 
(16.06) 
Log SALES 0.007*** 
(9.61) 
0.002*** 
(5.96) 
GROWTH 0.001 
(0.55) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
ROA -0.031*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.34) 
INVENTORY -0.008 
(-1.05) 
-0.007** 
(-1.97) 
Log FIRM AGE -0.003 
(-1.57) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.52) 
STATE -0.003 
(-1.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.63) 
GDP 0.006* 
(1.82) 
0.008*** 
(5.49) 
GDP GROWTH 0.820*** 
(11.57) 
-0.201*** 
(-6.48) 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION -0.451*** 
(-11.70) 
-0.214*** 
(-12.74) 
Observations 9978 9978 
Year dummies yes yes 
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Threshold in INCLUSION(a) 0.78 0.55 
Threshold in CONCENTRATION(b) 36% 31% 
z statistics or t statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. 
(a) Level of INCLUSION above which CONCENTRATION has a negative impact. 
(b) Level of CONCENTRATION above which INCLUSION has a negative impact. 
 
